It’s been 18 months since a military helicopter and regional jet collided over the Potomac River, and six months since the to improve airline safety at Reagan National Airport and throughout the U.S.
Last week, NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy called on Congress to pass a bill soon to address the gaps. But what do aviation experts think about what happened that night and the next steps to make the skies safer?
Susan Shoemaker is now retired. But, on the evening of Jan. 29, 2025, the night of the crash that killed 67 people, she was an air traffic control specialist at Reagan National Airport.
鈥淚 received a phone call asking if I had seen the news. Before I even knew more, I knew exactly what had happened and I was devastated because I had fought so hard to keep it from happening,” she said.
As an air traffic control specialist, quality control was Shoemaker鈥檚 job. She said it was her responsibility to 鈥渋dentify safety risks, collect data, analyze it, identify those risks and then try to fix the problems.鈥�
Shoemaker鈥檚 interview with 草莓传媒 is the first time she is speaking publicly about what happened that night and what she believes were contributing factors.
鈥淭he primary duty of the entire air traffic control system is to keep aircraft from hitting anything and, ultimately, that is accomplished by controllers who are responsible for filling that duty,” Shoemaker said. “They do that by applying the rules that govern their traffic control services and that ensure safe separation. And when you don’t follow those rules, bad things can happen.鈥�
The 鈥渞ules鈥� Shoemaker refers to are from .
鈥淔AA Order 7110.65 is considered the air traffic controllers鈥� bible. I wouldn’t go as far as to say it’s the rules and regulations. What it is, it provides guidance and procedures for controllers to do their job well,鈥� former NTSB and Federal Aviation Administration accident investigator Jeff Guzzetti said.
John Nance, a former Air Force pilot, commercial pilot and aviation analyst for ABC, said those guidelines are broken every day.
鈥淚t isn’t a question of, ‘Should we be breaking them?’ It’s a question of, ‘How realistic are they?'”
Nance told 草莓传媒, “We have tried to make an inhuman operation out of a human operation. We expect 100% performance, 100% of the time with no mistakes. That’s what .65 [Order 7110.65] is all about. But, guess what? Human beings are virtually and forever incapable of reaching that standard.”
In May, FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford there were failures in the Reagan National tower the night of the crash.
鈥淲e combined that desk in order to allow a controller to go do less valuable tasks, paperwork tasks. There was no reason that needed to happen at that point in time. That’s a decision-making error,鈥� Bedford testified. 鈥淭hen, obviously, there were controller errors in terms of providing visual separation context clues to the Black Hawk helicopter but not sharing those with the PSA captain.鈥�
During his testimony, Bedford also noted issues with staffing levels, outdated technology and information sharing 鈥� all of which he said are being addressed in a 鈥渟weeping reorganization鈥� of the FAA now underway.
Guzzetti and Nance agreed the crash causes can鈥檛 be boiled down to one specific factor.
鈥淭here is never one single solitary cause for an error or accident of any sort. There never has been. There never will be. There are always contributory causes and sometimes as many as 20 or 30,鈥� Nance said. 鈥淎nd if you’re going to prevent something like that from happening again, you’ve got to prevent everything that was a mistake or that was a problem that contributed to the accident, like a chain link. You’ve got to prevent every one of those links from happening again.鈥�
That鈥檚 where the NTSB鈥檚 50 recommendations come in.
“I think it was appropriate for the NTSB to not concentrate on the error of the controller or his failure to provide an alert, as per the FAA Order 7110.65, but instead address why the error is made and how the entire system was constructed that facilitated that error,鈥� Guzzetti said.
A timeline for implementing change
The FAA, the Pentagon and U.S. Department of Transportation are actively working to address the NTSB鈥檚 50 recommendations. Progress on each, as well as timelines and responses from the various agencies, can be viewed .
In a multi-paragraph statement sent to 草莓传媒 in March, the FAA provided a and said it “immediately鈥痑cted to improve safety.”
“We鈥痳educed鈥痶he DCA hourly鈥痑rrival鈥痳ate鈥痜rom鈥�36 to 26鈥痑nd restricted helicopter traffic in the surrounding airspace.鈥疻e gradually increased鈥痶he arrival rate鈥痶o鈥�30 after鈥痙etermining鈥痶hat鈥痷ptick鈥痗ould be handled safely, where it鈥痳emains鈥痶oday,” the FAA said.
“The FAA also moved quickly to bolster the DCA tower staffing. We increased the number of authorized certified professional controllers (CPCs), support managers, support staff specialists, operations managers and operations supervisors, while simultaneously filling those additional positions.”
The FAA has said its plans for an will be completed by 2028. But, Rick Castaldo, a retired FAA surveillance engineer, tells 草莓传媒 he believes it could take closer to 10 years due to staffing shortages and the time it takes to train technicians.
Meanwhile, , which would increase requirements for aircraft tracking, has so far failed to pass Congress.
“I think Administrator Bedford has his work cut out for him once he figures out what’s going to work and what’s achievable at a reasonable cost. But, it’s not going to be a year or two. I believe you’re looking at five to 10 years, even if it’s mandated,鈥� Castaldo said. 鈥淭here’s going to be a parade of lobbyists talking to Congress and the FAA about why they can’t make this happen quicker.”
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