In 草莓传媒’s three-part series “City of Secrets,”聽草莓传媒 National Security Correspondent J.J. Green talks to some of the best in the espionage game to find how spies have infiltrated Washington, D.C., and what can be done to catch them.
Nothing stood out about her.
She lived in a modest two-bedroom cooperative apartment on a quiet tree-lined street in D.C.鈥檚 Cleveland Park neighborhood. She drove a red 2000 Toyota Echo. She banked at Riggs Bank in the District’s Friendship Heights section. She was bright, engaging, trusted and well-adjusted at work.
But she was also something else.
Ana Belen Montes, 44, was a spy 鈥� engaged in one of the most devastating espionage operations in the history of the United States.
She was arrested on Sept. 21, 2001, and charged with conspiracy to deliver U.S. national defense information to Cuba.
Her arrest dealt a blow to the U.S. government, because she was a senior-level analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Her cover worked perfectly until, according to FBI documents, 鈥渁n astute DIA colleague 鈥� acting on a gut feeling 鈥� reported to a security official that he felt Montes might be under the influence of Cuban intelligence.鈥�
Scott Carmichael, now a former senior security and counterintelligence聽investigator聽for the聽Defense Intelligence Agency, was that 鈥渁stute colleague.鈥�
Another colleague who had suspicions was Chris Simmons, former chief of the Americas team with DIA鈥檚 counterintelligence research unit.
鈥淭here were gatherings in D.C. at various academic forums where Cuban intelligence officers would show up to do presentations, and she and other DIA employees went there. But they were warned by security to stop attending because 鈥榶ou鈥檙e at risk,’鈥� Simmons said.
All the others stopped attending, he said, 鈥渂ut she refused.鈥�
SIGN UP TODAY for J.J. Green鈥檚 new national security newsletter, “Inside the SCIF.” The weekly email delivers unique insight into the intelligence, national security, military, law enforcement and foreign policy communities.
It wasn鈥檛 until she received an ultimatum, according to Simmons 鈥� 鈥渟top attending or get fired鈥� 鈥� that she ceased going to the events.
Montes was so skilled at spying that during her years at DIA, even though security officials learned about her foreign policy views and were concerned about her access to sensitive information, they had no concrete reason to believe she was sharing secrets. Besides, she had passed a polygraph.
In her 15-year career at DIA, she had acquired a top-level security clearance and become DIA鈥檚 top Cuban analyst. And she was known throughout the U.S. intelligence community for her expertise.
Montes was in possession of extremely sensitive information 鈥� which it turned out she was giving to her Cuban handlers when they鈥檇 meet at various restaurants near D.C. Metro stops.
After a long investigation, authorities determined she was a spy and figured out how she鈥檇 been turned.
鈥淎 classic tale of recruitment鈥� is how official court documents in 2001 describe what happened.
In 1984, Montes worked in a clerical job at the Department of Justice in D.C. 鈥淪he often,鈥� according to one document, 鈥渟poke openly against the U.S. government鈥檚 policies towards Central America. Soon, her opinions caught the attention of Cuban 鈥榦fficials鈥� who thought she鈥檇 be sympathetic to their cause.鈥�
According to the FBI, she met with them and 鈥渟oon after, Montes agreed to help Cuba.鈥�
In order to do that, she sought out a job in the U.S. intelligence community and applied at DIA, an important producer of intelligence for the Pentagon. According to the court documents, by the time she started work there in 1985, 鈥渟he was a fully recruited spy.鈥�
鈥淭o escape detection, Montes never removed any documents from work, electronically or in hard copy,鈥� said the documents.
鈥淚nstead,鈥� Simmons said, 鈥渟he memorized the details and went home and typed them out on her laptop.鈥�
The court documents also indicate that she transferred the information onto encrypted disks. After receiving instructions from the Cubans in code via short-wave radio, she鈥檇 meet with her handler and turn over the disks.
Montes, serving a 25 year sentence, is scheduled to be released in 2023.
Her case was just one of many international spy stories that have unfolded in the D.C. area, and each is unique.
Another involved Kevin Mallory, a former CIA case officer who was recently sentenced to 20 years in prison on espionage charges.
鈥淢r. Mallory decided that five years after retirement, he needed to make extra money. He made his services available to the Chinese. We caught him. He was convicted of espionage and sentenced,鈥� said Brian Dugan, assistant special agent in charge of counterintelligence at the FBI鈥檚 D.C. field office.
What鈥檚 unique about Mallory鈥檚 case was the speed with which it was handled.
鈥淚t was actually a short case. Usually espionage cases take years. But in that specific case, it took months,鈥� Dugan said.
Technology and possibly carelessness contributed to the speedy resolution.
鈥淕one are the days of meeting handlers once in a while, to where we have Mallory talking on a regular basis to his handlers electronically in what he thought were hidden conversations. We were able to catch that and move on that quicker,鈥� Dugan said.
But in another way, Mallory鈥檚 case was not unique.
He was well liked in his Leesburg, Virginia, community, known for helping neighbors in their yards and assisting immigrants with their taxes, and he was a regular at church 鈥� all attributes that numerous past U.S. spies have exhibited.
Those attributes are also classic covers that spies often use to avoid suspicion.
